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ALL IS WELL IN MASSACHUSETTS?
DIAGNOSING THE EFFECTS OF THE 2006




In an era marked by skyrocketing health care costs, small businesses are
finding it increasingly difficult to provide and maintain health insurance
for their employees.' Small business owners repeatedly cite the high cost
of health insurance premiums as the main reason why they do not provide
2health insurance to their employees. Health care premiums for workers
rose, on average, by five per cent in 2008, accompanied by a growing trend
toward fgreater employee cost-sharing and increased restrictions on
benefits. According to a recent survey, the average premium for an
employer health plan covering a family of four in 2008 was $12,680,
reflecting an increase of $574 from the previous year, and the annual
premium for single coverage increased by $225 to a new average of $4,704
during the same period.4  While employer-sponsored health insurance
continues to be the primary source of coverage for the majority of
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1. William C. Symonds with Howard Gleckman, The Health-Care Crisis: States
Are Rushing In, Bus. WK., Nov. 28, 2005, at 49; see The Online NewsHour: The
Uninsured in America (PBS online news broadcast April 6, 2007) (transcript on file at
the PBS website, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth-coverage/health/uninsured/
(last visited Apr. 7, 2009)) [hereinafter NewsHour].
2. NewsHour, supra note 1.
3. Doug Trapp, Premiums for Job-Offered Health Insurance Up 5% this year,
AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 13, 2008, at 5.
4. Id. (citing statistics from THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. AND HEALTH
RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2008 ANNUAL SURVEY 11,
available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/7790.pdf (defining "family coverage" as health
coverage for a family of four)).
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Americans under the age of sixty-five, 5 employment-based coverage has
experienced a nearly ten per cent drop in just two decades. 6 This spiraling
health care cost forces business owners to look for ways to contain health
care spending, which has profound implications on employee coverage
across America.
This raging health care crisis, marked by unaffordability and an
increasing lack of access, has prompted many states to experiment with
alternative ways to provide universal coverage for their residents, although
their efforts thus far have often been met with frustration and little
success.7 The most recent data, released by the U.S. Census Bureau in
August of 2008, reported that over forty-five million Americans were still
without health insurance in 2007.8 The current state of the American
health care system rightly deserves the concern of all citizens across
political, social, and economic divides. Affordable health care nationwide
has also become a focal point in recent American political discourse. In
his first address to Joint Session of Congress in February of 2009, the new
President of the United States, Barack Obama, underscored his campaign
5. LISA CLEMANS-COPE & BOWEN GARRETT, CHANGES IN EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
HEALTH INSURANCE SPONSORSHIP, ELIGIBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION: 2001 TO 2005 (The
Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured 2006),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411619_healthinsurance.pdf ("The
majority of Americans under age 65 ('nonelderly') receive their health insurance
coverage through their own employer or the employer of a family member .... ). The
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured framed the central problem as
follows: "Because employer-sponsored insurance is voluntary on the part of businesses
and employees, not all firms offer health benefits, not all workers are eligible for
coverage, and not all employees choose to participate or can afford their share of the
health premium." Id
6. NewsHour, supra note 1; KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WHO ARE THE UNINSURED? A CONSISTENT
PROFILE ACROSS NATIONAL SURVEYS 5, http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7553.pdf
("The share of the uninsured from working families is likely to grow if the percent of
firms offering health benefits continues to decline and employee cost-sharing increases.
In 2005, only 60% of employers offered health insurance to their workers, compared to
69% in 2000."); see also Marie Gottschalk, Back to the Future? Health Benefits,
Organized Labor, and Universal Health Care, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 923, 923-
24 (2007) (quoting the President of the Service Employees International Union
decrying, "[w]e have to recognize that employer-based health care is ending. It is
dying in front of our very eyes.").
7. Symonds & Gleckman, supra note 1.
8. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 19 (2008), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf.
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promise to reform health care.9 The health care policy he has proposed
thus far seems to have borrowed elements from a model Massachusetts put
in place three years earlier. 10
In April 2006, the Massachusetts legislature passed a landmark
comprehensive health reform package,"' making Massachusetts the first
state in the nation to require all of its citizens to obtain health insurance
through legislative mandates. 12  Specifically, as of July 1, 2007, the
Massachusetts health care plan ("Massachusetts Plan") requires all adults
age eighteen or older to "obtain and maintain creditable coverage so long
as it is deemed affordable [by the state authority] ... This mandatory
health reform law, formally known as Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006: An
Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,
sets the ambitious goal of lowering the percentage of Massachusetts'
residents without insurance coverage "to as close to zero as possible"
through what its creators envisioned to be a "long-term" approach.'
4
The enactment of the Massachusetts Plan followed the publication of
state surveys, which estimated that approximately 372,000 to 550,000 of
9. President Barack Obama Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/Remarks-of-
President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress) ("[W]e must . . .
address the crushing cost of health care .... [W]e can no longer afford to put health
care reform on hold."); Associated Press: Obama: U.S. Ready for Health Care Reform,
MSNBC.com, Apr. 6, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17980179/print/l/
displaymode/1098 (quoting President Obama as saying that, "[t]he status quo is
unsustainable," and noting his belief if changes to the health care system are not made
the result could be catastrophic).
10. Jeremy Smerd, Massachusetts offers glimpse of health care under Obama, FIN.
WK., Nov. 12, 2008, http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/
20081112/ REG/811129989/-I/FWDAILYALERT0I (noting that both the Obama plan
and the Massachusetts plan "leave the employer-based health care system alone while
providing individuals access to cheaper insurance rates in the group market and
penalizing employers that do not offer health insurance.").
11. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,
2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58.
12. William C. Symonds, In Massachusetts, Health Carefor All, Bus. WK., Apr. 4,
2006, at 28.
13. MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. II IM, § 2(a) (2006).
14. ALAN G. RAYMOND, THE 2006 MASSACHUSETrS HEALTH CARE REFORM LAW:
PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES AFTER ONE YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2007), available
at http://masshealthpolicyforum.brandeis.edu/publications/pdfs/31 -MayO7/MassHealth
CareReformProgessReport.pdf.
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Massachusetts' 6.35 million residents were uninsured in 2006.15 With an
initial goal to provide health care coverage for up to ninety-five percent of
the state's uninsured population within three years of its implementation,'
6
the Massachusetts Plan imposes a system based on a concept of shared
responsibility, with "new burdens on individuals, on employers, and on the
government." 17 To accomplish this goal, the Massachusetts Plan includes
a series of financial penalties that target individuals who fail to purchase
health care when deemed financially capable of doing so by the state, and
employers who fail to provide health care for their employees. 8  The
Massachusetts Plan was strong in its ability to garner overwhelming
bipartisan support from state senators and congressmen. 9 Given that so
many Americans are uninsured, many view the Massachusetts Plan as "a
political experiment, a policy experiment, and a social experiment." 20 As
such, both the federal government and other state governments will,
without a doubt, closely monitor the outcome of the "Massachusetts
experiment" in order to determine its potential transferability nationwide.
21
15. Id. at 11 ("[I]n mid-2006, an estimated 372,000 Massachusetts residents, or
about 6 percent of the total population of 6.35 million, were uninsured ....");
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND AFFORDABILITY CONFERENCE
COMM. REPORT 1 (2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/summary.pdf
(estimating the number of uninsured residents to be as high as 550,000) [hereinafter
HEALTH CARE COMMITTEE REPORT].
16. Stuart H. Altman & Michael Doonan, Can Massachusetts Lead the Way in
Health Care Reform?, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2093, 2093 (2006).
17. Bill Dedman, Massachusetts is Health Care Lab: Businesses, Individuals
Wrestle with Implications of Universal Insurance, MSNBC.coM, Aug. 17, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20255585. See Mitt Romney, Remarks at the Lectures
and Seminar at the Heritage Foundation (Jan. 26, 2006) (audio recordings available at
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Events/evO I 2606b.cfm) [hereinafter Romney Remarks].
18. Infra Part II.B.
19. See Could Massachusetts Take the Lead on the Path to Health Care Reform?,
13 ST. HEALTH WATCH 1, 4 (2006) (quoting New American Foundation health policy
program director, describing Republican governor (Romney) "shaking hands with a
legislature that I think we would agree is among the bluest of the blue" legislatures in
the country.).
20. Dedman, supra note 17.
21. Elizabeth Weeks, Failure to Connect: The Massachusetts Plan for Individual
Health Insurance, 55 KAN. L. REv. 1283, 1284 (2007) ("Massachusetts's experience
offers important lessons for states attempting similar programs and begs the question
whether there are reasons that the Massachusetts Plan, even if successful there, could
be even more difficult to replicate elsewhere."); see generally Jane Zhang, States Take
a New Look at Health Reform, WALL ST. J., May 27-28, 2006, at A4 (quoting Vermont
governor's spokesperson: "If Ted Kennedy and the overwhelmingly Democrat
legislature in Massachusetts can come to an agreement with a Republican governor
2009
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This Note analyzes the continued viability of the Massachusetts Plan,
particularly with regard to the employer mandate under the Plan, which
contains a fair share contribution component and imposes a free-rider
surcharge assessment on non-compliant employers. Together, these two
provisions constitute the more controversial aspects of Chapter 58Y. This
Note posits that these provisions defining employer obligations in their
current structure fail to provide an effective means of encouraging small
businesses to provide or extend health care coverage to their employees.
Quite the opposite, acting separately and together, these provisions create
various incentives for small employers to shift their health care obligations
to their employees and the state. In addition, these provisions also
inadvertently punish small employers who offered health care prior to the
legal mandate by eliminating a valuable recruitment tool from their
arsenal. This Note expresses the concern that the negative economic
impacts created by the employer mandate may undermine the long-term
sustainability of the Massachusetts Plan. Finally, this Note advocates
against the inclusion of a similar mandate in the nation's current health
care reform efforts.
This Note begins with a brief review of Massachusetts' previous efforts
to expand health care to different sectors of the population to demonstrate
how these efforts paved the way for the state's eventual quest to provide
universal health coverage. Part I provides an overview that tracks the
evolution of the employer mandate and its turbulent path through the
Massachusetts legislature, beginning with its introduction in the 1970s, to
its subsequent repeal in the health care reforms of the 1980s, and ending
with its current inclusion under Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006. The
background section will also set forth relevant portions of both the
employer mandate and the free-rider surcharge assessment provisions in
order to illustrate the contours of employer obligations under the new
law.23 Part II offers three major criticisms of the immediate and long-term
impacts these employer provisions have on small businesses operating at
marginal profits. First, the employer mandate dilutes some small
businesses' ability to attract highly skilled and valuable workers while
allowing for other employers' potential exploitation of workers at or near
minimum wage jobs. Second, the enactment of the free-rider surcharge
assessment, initially intended to punish employers who do not uphold their
fair share of responsibilities in providing health coverage to employees,
actually encourages employers to take risks and free ride at the expense of
around the idea of private health insurance plans, then Vermont should be able to do it,
too."); Elizabeth Mehren, Expansive Health Plan Won't Fit All States, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
8, 2006, at A5.
22. See generally Weeks, supra note 21, at 1283-84.
23. See infra Part I.B.
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the state. Third, from a public policy perspective, the concept of shared
responsibility that is crucial to the Massachusetts Plan is undermined
because the inadequate design of the employer provision will likely cause
small business employers to be disproportionally affected. Part III
provides an updated report from Massachusetts, which was written two
years after the implementation of Chapter 58; the purpose of this report
was to assess the initial impact of the employer mandate on small
employers, and it highlights two particular challenges small employers
face. Part IV briefly ponders the transferability of the employer mandate
and concludes against its incorporation into current national health care
reform efforts.
I. MASSACHUSETTS' UNIQUE PATH TO MANDATORY HEALTH
CARE AND THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYER
MANDATE
A. Massachusetts' Previous Attempts at Universal Health Care: The Early
Setback and Eventual Implementation of the Employer Mandate
Massachusetts' recent efforts to reform its health care system began in
the early 1970s, when it became one of only a handful of states to enact
mandatory hospital rate-setting programs to impede hospital cost increases
by caping the annual revenue of acute care hospitals throughout the
state. 2 In the following decade, the rate of the uninsured population
steadily increased due to a recession, rapid health care cost inflation, and
structural changes in labor markets. 25  As the care for the uninsured
became highly concentrated and the burden of uncompensated care
24. JOHN E. McDONOUGH, THE ROAD TO UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE IN
MASSACHUSETTS: A STORY IN THREE PARTS 58 (2004), available at
http://www.mccormacktmp.umb.edu/nejpp/articles/20_I/RoadtoUniversalHealthCover
age.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2009) ("Because hospitals were considered the principal
source of inflation, states such as Maryland, New York, and New Jersey began
regulating total hospital budgets. Massachusetts joined them in 1975 creating a
hospital rate-setting program that set annual revenue caps for every acute care hospital
in the Commonwealth."); cf Kenneth R. Cone & David Dranove, Why Did States
Enact Hospital Rate-Setting Laws?, 29 J.L. & ECON. 287, 287 (1986) ("We consider
and reject the hypothesis that states enacted [hospital rate-setting] laws in response to
large general increases in hospital expenses. We conclude instead that states passed
these laws in order to reduce expenditures for hospitalized Medicaid patients.").
25. RANDALL R. BOVBJERG ET AL., THE URBAN INST., MARKET COMPETITION AND
UNCOMPENSATED CARE POOLS: OCCASSIONAL PAPER NUMBER 35 5 (2000).
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became unevenly distributed, hospitals with high levels of uncompensated
care faced increased financial strains.
26
One solution to the problem of finance disparities among hospitals was
the legislative creation of the Uncompensated Care Pool in the 1980s,27 an
early state mechanism designed to equitably pool and redistribute across
all hospitals in the state the burden of financing expensive medical services
to patients without insurance, a population that was estimated to approach
a staggering figure of 600,000 at the time.28 The main purpose of the
Uncompensated Care Pool was to reimburse hospitals with high uninsured
caseloads for unpaid services provided to low-income uninsured and
underinsured patients, 29 thereby improving access for the uninsured by
putting hospitals, particularly private ones, in a position where they are
economically indifferent to their patients' insurance status. 30 In order to
ensure sufficient funding for this pool, the state collected predetermined




27. JOHN HOLAHAN, RANDALL BOVBJERG, & JACK HADLEY, THE URBAN INST.,
CARING FOR THE UNINSURED IN MASSACHUSETTS: WHAT DOES IT COST, WHO PAYS AND
WHAT WOULD FULL COVERAGE ADD TO MEDICAL SPENDING? 36 (2004), available at
http://www.bcbsmafoundation.org/foundationroot/enUS/documents/roadmapReport.p
df. The Uncompensated Care Pool in Massachusetts was created in the 1980s using
wholly state-level resources for the main purpose of assuring adequate funding for
hospitals' free-care obligations through a method of reallocating resources from low-
free-care hospitals to high-free-care hospitals. Id.
28. MCDONOUGH, supra note 24, at 59; see also Joshua Greenberg & Barry
Zuckerman, State Health Care Reform in Massachusetts: How One State Expanded
Health Insurance for Children, 16 HEALTH AFF. 188, 189 (1997).
29. ROBERT W. SEIFERT, THE UNCOMPENSATED CARE POOL: SAVING THE SAFETY
NET 2 (2002), available at http://masshealthpolicyforum.brandeis.edu/publications/
pdfs/1 6-OctO2/IB%20UncompCarePool%2016.pdf (providing background information
on the Uncompensated Care Pool, also known as the "Free Care" Pool).
[T]he Commonwealth administers the Uncompensated Care Pool. "to
provide access to health care for low income uninsured and underinsured
residents of the commonwealth," to be administered in "the best interests of
low income uninsured and underinsured persons." The Pool pays hospital and
community health centers for services they provide to the uninsured and
underinsured. The Pool was created in 1985 and modified several times
since, most recently in 1997. The Pool is the "safety net" of our health care
system. It supports those who have no other way to pay for care.
Id. at 4 (internal citations omitted).
30. BOVBJERG ETAL.,supra note 25, at 2, 5.
31. SHARON SILOW-CARROLL & TANYA ALTERAS, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND,
STRETCHING STATE HEALTH CARE DOLLARS: INNOVATIVE USE OF UNCOMPENSATED
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While the pooling mechanism employed by the Massachusetts
legislature redistributed the hospitals' burden of providing uncompensated
care, it did not control the costs of such care. 32 As the cost of financing the
uninsured population became difficult to contain, many, including those in
the business sector, advocated universal coverage. 33 Significant legislation
emerged as a result, including a universal health care law in 198834 that
introduced an important feature that foreshadowed the current
Massachusetts Plan. The 1988 Plan mandated that all Massachusetts
residents be offered health insurance coverage by April of 1992 through a
combination of employer mandates and residual state insurance for the
unemployed. 35  Along with a continued implementation of rate-setting
mechanisms, the 1988 Plan specifically introduced a feature dubbed the
"play or pay" employer mandate,36 which required all employers with six
CARE FUNDS 15 (2004), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
usrdoc/784_Silow-Carroll stretchinguncompensated.pdf?section=4039. For
example, one report cited that in the Fiscal Year 2004, the Massachusetts
Uncompensated Care Pool was financed through "assessments on hospitals . . insurers
I . . , intergovernmental transfers, state funds ... , federal matching [Medicaid
Disproportionate Share Hospital Funds] dollars . . .. tobacco settlement funds, and
other sources ..... Id.
32. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 6.
33. Jennifer N. Edwards et al., Small Business and the National Health Care
Reform Debate, 11 HEALTH AFF. 164, 168 (1992) (explaining that two-thirds of small
businesses would support universal access over the health system then in place).
34. See An Act to Make Health Insurance Available to all Members of the
Commonwealth and to Improve Hospital Financing, ch. 23, 1988 Mass. Acts 85.
35. ALAN SAGER ET AL., NINE LESSONS FOR NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM FROM THE
FAILURE OF THE 1988 MASSACHUSETTS UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE LAW 2 (1993),
available at http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/hs/NineLessonsfrom theFailure-of the 1988
_MassachusettsU.pdf.
36. MICHAEL TANNER, THE HERITAGE FOUND., As WASHINGTON DITHERS, STATES
REFORM HEALTH CARE 2-3 (1991). Under a "play or pay" system, an employer is taxed
by the state in order to help fund the public insurance for the uninsured population.
The tax on the employer's business would be "offset by a tax deduction for the cost of
paying for private health insurance to his own workforce." Id. Hence, private
employers face two options: they can either pay for private health insurance for their
employees (play) or alternatively pay a tax that will finance public insurance for
uninsured employees through a public program (pay). Id. States typically institute a
"play or pay" system to circumvent the "preemption clause" of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, which prohibits states from directly
mandating businesses to provide health insurance. Id. at 2; see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(2000); cf Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007)
(holding that ERISA preempts the Maryland "Fair Share Act," which required
employers with 10,000 or more Maryland employees to spend at least eight percent of
2009
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or more employees to either provide health coverage or pay a tax of $1,680
per worker to compensate the state for covering their uninsured workers.
37
This employer mandate, however, was never successfully
implemented. 38 Hampered by the economic recession of the early 1990s,
continued medical inflation, growing opposition from the business
community, and changes in the political scene, the Massachusetts
legislature first voted to delay implementation of the employer mandate for
three years and then failed to provide the necessary funds to finance the
provision, thereby allowing the employer mandate to quietly and gradually
"fade out" of the health reform discourse. 39 While rate-setting continued
as a means of containing hospital costs, the control mechanisms central to
these laws were relaxed to a great extent; although some portions of the
payroll on employees' health costs, or pay the amount their spending falls below that
level into a state fund).
37. An Act to Make Health Insurance Available to all Members of the
Commonwealth and to Improve Hospital Financing, ch. 23, § 46(a), (e)(2), 1988 Mass.
Acts 142; see also Susan Goldberger, The Politics of Universal Access: The
Massachusetts Health Security Act of 1988, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 857, 876
(1990) (explaining that under the 1998 Act "the payroll tax on employers who did not
provide insurance jumped to 12 percent ...regressively applied to only the first
$14,000 of wages, resulting in a tax amount of $1,680.").
38. TANNER, supra note 36, at 3 ("Massachusetts did enact an employer mandate in
1988, but the program has never been put into effect because of fears that the measure
would raise business costs significantly and create unemployment and an economic
slowdown.").
39. See CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., STATE EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE
MANDATES: A BRIEF HISTORY 2 (2005), available at http://www.chcf.org/
documents/insurance/sb2/employman/EmployerlnsuranceMandates.pdf
The Massachusetts "pay or play" program was never implemented because of
a severe economic downturn and because the program's most important
political sponsor, Democratic governor Michael Dukakis, left office before
the employer mandate was to take effect. His successor, Republican William
Weld, announced his opposition to the program and the state legislature
postponed implementation and eventually repealed the mandate.
Id.; see also Eric Zicklin, Massachusetts' "'Miracle" Reform Plan Stalls, Bus. &
HEALTH, Sept. 1992, at 50. Weld offered two reasons for his opposition to the "play or
pay" mandate: "First, the strategy affirms the accidental link of health insurance to the
employer-employee relationship. Second, pay-or-play is a terribly regressive tax
policy, hitting small businesses harder than big businesses that are generally already
offering their workers health insurance." Id.; SAGER, ET AL., supra note 35, at 2
("Early in 1991, the Massachusetts legislature voted to delay implementation of the
employer mandate for three years. The legislature has never acted to provide the funds
required to finance the state's obligation.").
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health care legislation survived, 40 little cost control mechanisms actually
remained.4 1
In 1991, Massachusetts deregulated hospital rates in an effort to move to
competitive pricing after a strongly pro-market Republican governor took
office. 42 Although the Uncompensated Care Pool remained in place, by
December of 1991, all regulatory rate controls were repealed and insurers
were able to directly interact with hospitals to determine their respective
rates.43 Proponents of health care deregulation and managed competition
believed such a move would "unleash creative forces in the marketplace to
provide quality health care in Massachusetts at costs that would be held in
check by the dynamic of free-market competition. '44  The 1990s were
marked by the expansion of managed care medicine, hospital mergers and
consolidations, and insurer mergers.45 Low levels of medical inflation, a
nationwide trend at the time, briefly followed this gradual deregulation.
46
When the health care inflation problem resurfaced again just a few years
later, however, it became apparent that deregulation failed to expand
access to health care; consequently, Massachusetts was forced to review its
47health care program.
In the 1990s, even as Massachusetts moved towards deregulation and a
more market-based health care system, there was the recognition that this
40. MCDONOUGH, supra note 24, at 60. Some portions of the Massachusetts health
care legislation implemented in the 1980s survive today. These portions include:
CommonHealth, a program that provides coverage for disabled adults and children;
Healthy Start, a program which covers low-income pregnant women; Medical Security
Plan, which enables uninsured workers to obtain care during unemployment; and a
provision which requires all college students to obtain insurance coverage. Id.
41. MCDONOUGH, supra note 24, at 59; John E. McDonough, Tracking the Demise
of State Hospital Rate Setting, 16 HEALTH AFF. 142, 142-43 (1997) (examining the
factors that led states, including Massachusetts, to drop rate setting). The mid-1990s
saw a series of deregulations across the nation that reflected changes in the nation's
health policy. State rate setting regulations, once implemented by more than thirty
states in the 1980s, had nearly become extinct in the ensuing ten years. Id. at 142.
42. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 9; see also JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., THE
URBAN INST., HEALTH POLICY FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE IN MASSACHUSETrS 9 (1997)
(noting that Governor Weld, once in office, "moved quickly to deregulate health care
and to rein in Medicaid cost increases.").
43. HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 34.
44. JEROME H. GROSSMAN, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE IN
MASSACHUSETTS 1990-2000 xi (Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research 2000).
45. Id.
46. McDONOUGH, supra note 24, at 60.
47. Id. at 60-61.
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shift had little impact on those individuals lacking health care coverage.48
To reduce the number of uninsured residents, a series of federal assistance
and new state initiatives were put in place during the following years. On
the federal level, the Medicaid program sought to extend coverage to the
"working poor" in order to offset the problem of small employers,
operating at low profits, who either did not offer insurance, or offered
insurance at unaffordable prices.49 On the state level, initiatives such as
the small group market reform, which allowed small businesses to join
together, enabled small business employers to purchase insurance at more
favorable rates.5 ° By 1996, the Massachusetts legislature repealed the
remnants of the unpopular employer mandate and replaced it with a
substitute plan that subsidized employer coverage for low-income
workers. 51 This newly-implemented Insurance Partnership, advertised by
its creators as "universal coverage without an employer mandate,
' 52
authorized the use of state funds to defuse the health care expenses of
small businesses and provided employee contribution subsidies for low-
income employees. 53 By the end of the 1990s, as a result of these federal
and state efforts, Massachusetts' uninsured 5opulation was just ten percent,
which was one of the smallest of any state.
Dramatic increases in health insurance premiums since 2000, however,
have led some employers to terminate coverage for their employees.55
Significant decreases in health care coverage placed enormous financial
pressure on both the state's Uncompensated Care Pool and health care
providers treating uninsured patients.V6 At the same time, new premiums
and other cost-sharing mechanisms were imposed on the insured
population, while vital benefits such as dental and vision services were
eliminated from most health care plans. 57  In short, even insured
individuals in Massachusetts were paying higher premiums for lower
quality health care services.
In 2003, the state began to work on a more comprehensive plan to
address its health care problems. The mission, which would culminate in
48. GROSSMAN, supra note 44, at 27.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. McDONOUGH, supra note 24, at 61.
52. id.
53. GROSSMAN, supra note 44, at 27.
54. Id. at 28; see also HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 2 (noting that at the time
of a 1996-1998 study, Massachusetts had a comparatively high rate of health insurance
coverage).
55. MCDONOUGH, supra note 24, at 62.
56. Id.
57 Id
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the current Massachusetts Plan, called for an expansion of access to
coverage that would "include[] creation of a lower cost insurance product
for the uninsured, subsidization of the product for lower income residents,
and requirements for all employers to pay some portion of the cost of
insurance." 58 Most importantly, policy makers seemed to recognize that a
comprehensive plan of this magnitude would require a joint effort from
multiple sectors of the population, including monetary contributions from
each sector.59 Under the call for shared responsibility, the Massachusetts
legislature sought to reintroduce the previously repealed employer
mandate, which required employers throughout the state to contribute to
the growing cost of health care.
58. Id.; see generally THE ASSOCIATED INDUS. OF MASS. FOUND., INC.,
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM: A BACKGROUNDER ON THE LANDMARK
HEALTH INSURANCE LAW (2006), available at http://www.aimnet.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTI
D=9540 (listing factors which made Massachusetts well positioned for health care
reform).
59. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Agricultural Resources,
Health Care Reform Act of 2006, http://www.mass.gov/agr/news/health-care
_reformact.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
The [Health Care Reform Act] is built on the concept of shared
responsibility-between people, business, and government. It requires all
persons to purchase health coverage if they can afford it. It requires
businesses that do not provide coverage to employees, to help pay for it. It
requires the government to provide subsidies to ensure affordability.
Id.
60. Steven LeBlanc, House Overrides Romney's Health Care Vetoes,
BOSTON.COM, Apr. 25, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/
articles/2006/04/25/housebeginsoverrides of romneys_health carevetoes.
Democratic leaders said it was important [to override the governor's veto of
the employer mandate] because the law already asks individuals and the state
to take some responsibility to expand health care, and businesses should be
required to chip in, too. 'This assessment forces everyone to contribute
equally. This forces everyone to participate.'
Id. See also LAURIE FELLAND, DEBRA DRAPER, & ALLISON LIEBHABER, MASS-
ACHUSETTS HEALTH REFORM: EMPLOYERS, LOWER-WAGE WORKERS AND UNIVERSAL
COVERAGE 2 (Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Issue Brief 113, Jul. 2007),
available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/939/939.pdf (noting that policy
makers designed a plan "with less onerous requirements" because they were mindful of
the employer backlash to the employer mandate in the 1988 reform effort).
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B. The Relevant Employer Mandate Provisions of Chapter 58 of the Acts
of 2006
Prior to the enactment of this new law, Massachusetts had a relatively
strong base of employer-sponsored insurance: ninety-eight percent of
employers with more than one hundred employees and sixty-five percent
of smaller employers were already contributing to their employees' health
insurance.61 Noting the strength of its employer-sponsored insurance, as
62well as the already significant spending on the uninsured, the
Massachusetts Plan's creators had political confidence in reintroducing the
still controversial employer mandate. In broad strokes, the new law first
requires all employers with eleven or more full-time equivalent employees
to adopt and maintain a plan that satisfies Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
Section 125 and to file a copy of the plan with the appropriate authority in
63order to avoid liability. Dubbed the "cafeteria plans," IRC Section 125
enables employees to purchase their health insurance with pre-tax
dollars.64 Under the Massachusetts Plan, employers also need to provide
access to group health care coverage, either under its own group health
plan 65 or through the Connector, which was a mechanism created under the
new law to serve as an insurance marketplace where employers and
employees can access and purchase insurance products of their choice
using pre-tax dollars. 66 This portion of the Act is intended to alleviate the
employers' responsibilities by requiring them to take advantage of the
"significant savings" the federal Tax Code provides. 67
61. HEALTH CARE COMMITFEE REPORT, supra note 15.
62. Id. (explaining that spending on the uninsured was over $600 million in the
Uncompensated Care Pool).
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2 (2006) ("Each employer with more than 10
employees in the commonwealth shall adopt and maintain a cafeteria plan that satisfies
26 U.S.C. 125 and the rules and regulations promulgated by the connector."); see 26
U.S.C. § 125 (2006).
64. 26 U.S.C. § 125; RAYMOND, supra note 14, at 7.
65. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2006) (Defining "contributing employer"
as an employer that offers a group health plan.. to which the employer makes a fair and
reasonable premium contribution .... ).
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § 2 (2006). The Act creates an independent
public authority called the Connector to administer the Commonwealth Care Health
Insurance Program and to facilitate the purchase of health insurance plans that meet
quality and other standards set by the Connector's board. The Connector determines
the premium assistance subsidy levels for Commonwealth Care Health Insurance
Program enrollees and will remit the premium assistance payments to the health plans
offering the coverage. See generally RAYMOND, supra note 14.
67. HEALTH CARE COMMirrEE REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
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The Massachusetts Plan introduces a "Fair Share Contribution"
provision,68 which requires employers not making health care insurance
contributions to reimburse the state for free care received by their
employees.69  This levels the playing field because employers not
providing health care benefits will no longer receive a "free ride" at the
expense of the state.7 0 Under this provision, "fair and reasonable premium
contribution" is defined on the basis of an employer "having at least 25
percent of full-time employees (35 hours or more per week) enrolled in the
employer's health plan or having the employer offer to pay at least 33
percent of the employee insurance plan's premium cost.' '7  Furthermore,
an employer's fair share contribution amount is pro-rated for temporary or
seasonal employees.72 An employer who fails both the twenty-five percent
and the thirty-three percent tests will be assessed an annual "fair share
contribution" of up to 295 dollars for each full-time employee.73
The chief enforcement mechanism concerning employer contribution
under the new law is a "free rider" surcharge that penalizes non-providing
employers by requiring them to pay a fine to the state when their
employees use "excessive" uncompensated care.74  Specifically, the
68. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(b), (c)(10) (2006).
(b) For the purpose of more equitably distributing the costs of health care
provided to uninsured residents of the commonwealth, each employer that (i)
employs II or more full-time equivalent employees in the commonwealth and
(ii) is not a contributing employer shall pay a per-employee contribution at a
time and in a manner prescribed by the director of the department of labor, in
this section called the fair share employer contribution. Said contribution
shall be pro-rated by a fraction which shall not exceed one, the numerator of
which is the number of hours worked in a year by all of the employer's
employees who worked for the employer for at least I month ....
(c)(10) Notwithstanding this section, the total annual fair share employer
contribution shall not exceed $295 per employee ....
Id.
69. Id.; Robert Steinbrook, Health Care Reform in Massachusetts - A Work in
Progress, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2095, 2096 (2006) (noting that Governor Romney's
veto of the employer penalty was overridden by the legislature); see also FELLAND,
supra note 60, at I ("Employers with II or more full-time-equivalent employees that
do not [provide § 125 Cafeteria plans] may be subject to a 'free-rider' surcharge if their
employees' or dependents' care is paid for by the state's Uncompensated Care Pool.").
70. See RAYMOND, supra note 14, at 6-7.
71. Id. at6.
72. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(b) (2006).
73. Id. § 188(c)(10).
74. RAYMOND, supra note 14, at 7; see also John E. McDonough, et. al.,
Massachusetts Health Reform Implementation: Major Progress and Future Challenges,
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Massachusetts Plan provides that this "free rider" surcharge may be
assessed on non-providing employers if their employees, in the aggregate,
receive free care five times or more in one year, or if any employee or an
employee's dependent receives free care more than three times.75 The
surcharge assessment, determined by the Division of Health Care Finance
and Policy, reflects an amount that "shall be greater than 10 per cent but no
greater than 100 per cent of the cost to the state" of free care that exceeds
50,000 dollars.
76
II. THE EMPLOYER MANDATE AND ITS DISPROPORTIONATE
BURDEN ON SMALL BUSINESSES: AN ILL-FITTED PRESCRIPTION
FOR UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE
The Massachusetts Plan's requirement that employers provide health
care for their employees would likely exacerbate the current dilemma
small businesses already face in choosing between providing coverage and
remaining competitive in the marketplace. 77 Given rising medical costs,
27 HEALTH AFF. w285, w291 (2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/
abstract/hlthaff.27.4.w285v 1.
75. RAYMOND, supra note 14, at 7.
76. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 18B(b) (2006).
The amount of the free rider surcharge on non-providing employers shall be
determined by the division under regulation promulgated by the division, and
assessed by the division not later than 3 months after the end of each hospital
fiscal year, with payment by non-providing employers not later than 90 days
after the assessment. The amount charged by the division shall be greater
than 10 per cent but no greater than 100 per cent of the cost to the state of the
services provided to the state-funded employee, considering all payments
received by the state from other financing sources for free care; provided that
the "cost to the state" for services provided to any state-funded employee may
be determined by the division as a percentage of the state's share of aggregate
costs for health services. The free rider surcharge shall only be triggered
upon incurring $50,000 or more, in any hospital fiscal year, in free care
services for any employer's employees, or dependents of such persons, in
aggregate, regardless of how many state-funded employees are employed by
the employer.
Id.
77. See Alexandra Marks, Moving Healthcare up on U.S. Agenda, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, May 25, 2005, at 2 (explaining that in order to compensate for rapidly
increasing health care benefits costs, corporations have begun shifting these costs to
employees while many small businesses have stopped offering these benefits; these
rising costs have also made American businesses less competitive in the global market
place).
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the employer mandate at the threshold level imposes an excessive financial
burden on small businesses and makes their costs of conducting business
permanently higher.78 The adverse impact has already been felt by some
small business employers in Massachusetts, including a few family-owned
seasonal businesses with small profit margins that have never offered
health insurance to their employees. 79 Even employers who already offer
insurance will face greater financial burdens under the new plan because
more employees will be required to sign up for their business' health
plan. One initial fear was that the employer provisions, as applied to
small businesses, could force these businesses to bear additional expenses
to the cost of their daily business operations.
81
A reconsideration of the employer provision is essential to the long-term
success of the Massachusetts Plan. First, with the imposition of an
employer mandate, small businesses with fewer resources and smaller
profit margins may become unable to stay afloat when they are not capable
of forecasting the rising cost of health care. Under the current structure of
the Massachusetts Plan, these businesses are, in effect, punished for
providing health insurance to their employees. Second, the fair share
contribution and the associated free-rider penalty create an incentive for
small businesses to forgo providing health insurance for employees and
instead opt to pay the fixed, statutory "fair share contribution" amount of
78. Id. ("'There's no doubt that there's a crisis in healthcare, particularly in small
business. We've been seeing the heaviest increases in the last five years of anyone,'
says Amanda Austin, manager of legislative affairs at the National Federation of
Independent Businesses, the nation's largest lobby for small businesses.").
79. See Dedman, supra note 17.
80. Id.
81. PHIL PRIMACK, SMALL EMPLOYERS AND EXPANDED HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE 1-3 (New England Public Policy Center at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston) 2007, available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neppc/briefs/2007/
briefs075.pdf (noting that in general, smaller firms face higher premiums). In addition,
this brief quotes Eileen McAnneny, Vice President of Government Affairs for
Associated Industries of Massachusetts as stating that if more employees enroll in their
employers' plans as a result of the imposed mandates, it "carries real financial
consequences for employers who have not budgeted for such a cost increase." Id. In
general, while most uninsured individuals are in working families, they are not "spread
evenly across the workplace. Instead, they are heavily concentrated in the small-
business sector." Stuart M. Butler, Reducing Uninsurnace by Reforming Health
Insurance in the Small-Business Sector, 1769 BACKGROUNDER 1, 1-2 (2004), available
at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/bg I769.cfm#pgfld- 1127504.
A Kaiser survey in 2004 reported that "almost half (48.7 percent) of all uninsured
workers are either self-employed or work for firms with fewer than 25 workers." Id.
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295 dollars per full-time employee under the Plan. 82 The existence of a
fixed statutory amount encourages more risk taking and free-riding
behavior on the part of small business owners. Finally, the negative
incentives created by the employer provisions render the Massachusetts
Plan incapable of remaining faithful to its call of shared responsibility by
all sectors of society in resolving the state's health care crisis.
A. The Employer Mandate "Punishes" Small Businesses for Providing
Health Care to Their Employees and Takes a Valuable Recruitment Tool
Away from Small Employers
The most glaring problem with the enactment of an employer mandate is
that it inevitably creates a set of negative incentives that alter employer
behaviors in the marketplace. These problems are especially pronounced
in the case of small businesses with marginal profits that are now under a
legal mandate to provide insurance coverage for their employees. As one
recent survey declares, "health-care costs have been small businesses'
biggest problem for more than 20 years." 83 The same survey notes that in
response to premium hikes in recent years, smaller companies are
"scrapping their insurance programs, and new ones are more reluctant to
offer health benefits." 84 Opponents of the employer mandate, including
the National Association of Professional Employer Organizations
(NAPEO), fear that the employer mandate may undercut the creation of
jobs by imposing excessive financial burdens on small businesses.85 One
observer summarizes the main concern of many small business owners:
It's hard enough for small businesses to cope with all the things
thrown at them in the normal course of doing business .... When
you add this nightmare-the worry of how in the world you're
going to insure yourself and your family and your handful of
workers-things start to look bleak indeed for small business, which
creates most of the nation's jobs.
86
For small businesses, one of the main challenges they now face is that,
at a threshold level, the costs and risks associated with conducting business
are permanently higher due to the unpredictable nature of insurance
82. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(c)(10) (2006) (providing that "total
annual fair share employer contribution shall not exceed $295 per employee").
83. NAT'L Ass'N OF PROF'L EMPLOYER ORGS., REPORT ON THE NOVEMBER 2007
SURVEY OF BUSINESSES SERVED BY PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYER ORGANIZATIONS,
http://www.napeo.org/newscenter/researchsurveyl 107.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2009)
[hereinafter SURVEY ON SMALL BUSINESS].
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Milan P. Yager, NAPEO's executive vice president).
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premium increases each year.87 Moving beyond this threshold level, the
employer mandate under the current plan may alter small business
employer behaviors in other ways. First, prior to the employer mandate,
the inclusion of health insurance coverage was an important inducement
mechanism for small businesses to recruit and maintain valuable
workers. 8 Indeed, nearly half of the small businesses surveyed by
NAPEO named health care benefits as an important tool that allows them
to attract qualified employees and remain competitive in the marketplace.
89
When the employer mandate eliminates the voluntary disbursement of
health care coverage, small businesses already providing coverage are
essentially punished because the mandate takes away their competitive
edge by requiring each employer to provide similar coverage. The loss of
health care benefits as a valuable recruitment tool has an added impact on
small businesses, not only because they often face more direct and
pronounced difficulties with vacant positions,9" but also because small
business employment can be viewed as less desirable due to less
professional opportunities and benefits associated with these jobs.9 1 An
87. See generally id.
88. NATIONAL COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, THE IMPACT OF RISING HEALTH CARE
COSTS ON THE ECONOMY: EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESSES 3 (2008),
http://www.nchc.org/documents/Costs-Small%20Businesses-2009.pdf ("Most small
employers that do offer health benefits report that it has a positive impact on various
aspects of the business, such as recruitment, retention, employee attitude and
performance, employee health status, and the overall success of the business.").
89. SURVEY ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 83.
90. NFIB NAT'L SMALL BUS. POLL, THE CHANGING SEARCH FOR EMPLOYEES 3
(William J. Dennis, Jr. ed., 2001) ("The lack of a full employee complement has its
most severe impact on small employers themselves. In 83 percent of the cases where
small employers go without, they are personally required to work more hours ....
Existing employees often share the extra burden created by the vacant positions."); see
also Andrea Coombes, Benefits in Balance: Small Firms Often Must Work Harder to
Offer Valued Perks to Workers, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 21, 2007,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/small-firms-work-harder-benefits/story.aspx?
guid={25D9AE82-524A-418B-85B5B2AOOD9B5147} (stating that although
opportunities for advancement may be limited at a small company, one key benefit
workers may receive is "[i]nvolvement in day-to-day decision-making ..... 'One
person can make a huge difference [in a small company]."').
91. Coombes, supra note 90 (positing that it would not be surprising ifjob seekers
bypassed smaller firms altogether because of factors such as lack of paid vacation,
lower salaries than counterparts at bigger firms, and more limited opportunities for
advancement); Jim Hopkins, Small Employers Struggle to Fill Jobs, USA TODAY, Jan.
4, 2007, at 3B ("Small-business advisers say [that] ... small employers must consider
raising wages and adding benefits.. to better compete with big corporations.");
PRIMACK, supra note 81, at I ("Employees working for large employers are
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employer mandate, therefore, directly and indirectly hurts small businesses
that use health care as an effective means of recruiting and retaining a
valuable workforce.
Second, mandating employers to provide health insurance will likely
depress current wages. 92  With all other variables being equal, the
employer mandate in effect forces new expenses on employers who may
not have traditionally offered health insurance, making it more expensive
for these employers to operate and maintain their businesses. 93 This new
expense, akin to an added annual tax on the cost of conducting business,
may force some small businesses to fold when the new financial burden of
providing insurance coverage exceeds their profit margins.94  Small
business employers forced to provide coverage may have an added
incentive to implicitly "pass" their expenses to employees by reducing
employee wages in order to maintain competitiveness with their
counterparts in other states that are under no legal obligation to provide
employee coverage. 95 This incentive to reduce current employee wages
significantly more likely than those employed by small firms . . . to be eligible for
and/or covered by employer-based health insurance ... ").
92. Patrice Flynn et al., State Health Reform: Effects on Labor Markets and
Economic Activity, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 219 (1997) (suggesting that an
employer mandate will reduce employees' wages in the long run while creating a drop
in profit margins in the short run).
93. See Jim Hopkins, Finding First Aid for Small Companies' Health Costs, USA
TODAY, Apr. 19, 2006, at 9B ("Small businesses are driven crazy by soaring employee
health costs, an expense that surveys show has become the biggest headache and
obstacle to growth.").
94. Kent Hoover, Insurance Mandate Hard to Sell in Recession, MINNEAPOLIS-ST.
PAUL Bus. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at 7.
Small businesses with low profit margins 'simply don't have the money' to
offer health insurance to their employees .... Many retailers operate on
profit margins as thin as 1 percent to 2 percent .... According to the vice
president of the National Retail Federation, "[i]f you increase the cost of labor
[as a result of insurance mandates], certainly in our industry, you run the
danger of running us out of business."
Id. Governor Romney, in a speech at The Heritage Foundation, emphasized that the
Massachusetts plan was carefully structured to avoid the need to raise new direct taxes
for its finance. Governor Mitt Romney, Remarks at the Lectures and Seminar at the
Heritage Foundation' (Jan. 26, 2006) (audio recordings available at
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Events/ev012606b.cfm).
95. Jeremy Smerd, Health-care reform could spread job-hopping bug, study
shows, (web only), FIN. WK., Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.financialweek.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090106/REG/901069989/- 1/FWDAILYALERTOI (reporting
that the Congressional Budget Office study found that "employer-based health
insurance depresses wages, since the cost of providing health insurance ultimately
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will presumably have a disproportionately harmful impact on employees
working at or near federal minimum wage; 96 these employees are
especially vulnerable to the possibility of losing their jobs when their
wages cannot be reduced any further.
97
Alternatively, small business employers may be inclined to hire fewer
full-time workers and seek ways to delay or eliminate health benefits for
these workers, in order to contain the administrative cost of paying these
workers' health care under the mandate. 98  One way for employers to
minimize their expenses is to reduce the number of workers to the absolute
minimum necessary to maintain the daily operation of business.
99
Employers may choose this route to cut their expenses in low-income
industries where the rising cost of insurance may enlarge the expense of
paying for each additional employee. Cumulatively, these alternative cost
containment methods affect the state's overall economy by expanding the
unemployment pool in the short-term, while decelerating the creation of
jobs in the long-term.
100
The employer mandate under the Massachusetts Plan creates potentially
dangerous consequences for small businesses with limited resources and
employees. Small businesses will likely explore ways to avoid health care
leaves less money for wages. American companies that provide health insurance there-
fore are not at a competitive disadvantage against those that do not, since the company
pays for health insurance by reducing wages.").
96. See KATHERINE BAICKER & HELEN LEVY, EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE
MANDATES AND THE RISK OF UNEMPLOYMENT 2, (Employment Policies Inst. 2005),
available at http://www.epionline.org/studies/baicker_06-2005.pdf (stating that
"employers, where possible, will transfer the cost of a new mandate fully onto
employees in the form of reduced wages. This process works smoothly for employees
whose wages are high enough above the minimum wage to allow for full wage
shifting.").
97. See id.
98. See generally Eduardo Porter, Cost of Benefits Cited as Factor in Slump in
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at Al, C2. "Government data, industry surveys and
interviews with employers big and small indicate that many businesses remain reluctant
to hire full-time employees because health insurance.., has become one of the fastest-
growing costs for companies." Id. One of the small employers interviewed by Porter
summed it up stating, "In the past we would hire people right out of the gate, and they
could get on the health plan in 60 days .... Now we use temp services. I can keep a
temp for 90 to 120 days, and the agency pays for [their] health benefits." Id.
99. Id. at Al (quoting a Wells Fargo spokesperson, "In other business cycles,
businesses hired in anticipation of demand; that's no longer the case. []Today
businesses only hire people because they have to, to meet demand.").
100. See generally Martin Wolk, Small Business Having a Big Impact on Jobs,
MSNBC.coM, Feb. 3, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4142727 (describing the
role of small businesses in the nation's job creation).
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obligations under the mandate in order to maintain their businesses.
0 1
Employers' decisions to decrease wages and employees - which negatively
affect small businesses' hiring practices, the labor market and the state's
overall economy - could significantly undermine the long-term
sustainability of the Massachusetts Plan.
B. The Fair Share Contribution and Free Rider Surcharge Assessment
Encourage Small Businesses to Engage in Risky and Free Riding
Behaviors
As mentioned previously, under the Massachusetts Plan, if businesses
with eleven or more employees do not pay a fair share of the cost for
employee insurance coverage, they face a penalty. 102 Consistent with the
spirit of the Massachusetts Plan, this "free rider surcharge"10 3 was enacted
to eliminate unnecessary free care where possible and to induce employers
to provide health care insurance for their employees. 
104
The free rider penalty, as structured, presents a few potential problems.
First, the relatively low - but, more importantly, fixed - one-time fair share
assessment of no more than 295 dollars per employee, per year, deters
small business employers from providing insurance for their employees
when doing might mean higher and more unpredictable expenses.
05
Instead, more small business employers may be inclined to take risks and
adopt a wait-and-see approach, by declining to provide insurance options
up-front. Under the literal interpretation of Chapter 58, small businesses
are not required to pay for anything in a given year under the following
circumstances: (a) if none of their employees access any free care, 106 (b) if
their employees do not exceed the number of free care visits permitted by
101. Hoover, supra note 94 (quoting a senior manager for health policy at the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce as saying that many employers are laying off workers, reducing
benefits and looking for other ways to reduce costs in order to pay for mandated health
insurance).
102. Supra Part I.B.
103. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 1 18G, § 18B (2006).
104. RAYMOND, supra note 14, at 4, 6-7.
105. See FELLAND ET AL., supra note 60, at 1-2 (noting that market observers do not
expect this "fair and reasonable" contribution to have much overall impact).
Observers view the fee as a way to offset the cost shifting that occurs when
employers that provide health coverage to their workers also contribute to the
uncompensated care pool; they do not expect the fee to induce employers who
do not currently offer coverage to workers to begin doing so since insurance
costs significantly more than the fee.
Id.
106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 1 18G, § 18B(b) (2006).
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the plan, either aggregately or individually, 0 7 or (c) if the total cost of free
care provided to their employees does not surpass 50,000 dollars. 1 8 Even
assuming a scenario where some or all of a small business' employees
exceed the number of free medical care allotted under law, thereby
invoking the free-rider penalty, the wording of this provision explicitly
guarantees that their employers need not pay for the full market cost of the
medical services, because that cost would never be "greater than 100
percent of the cost to the state" of providing these services.' ° 9 At worst,
small businesses only need to pay a capped amount of 295 dollars per
worker to satisfy their fair share contribution requirement, which may
prove to be a cheaper alternative in the long-term, as the fear of continued
surges in health care costs persist.' ° Likewise, small business employers
already providing insurance coverage prior to the legal mandate may also
have an incentive to shift to the payment of the nominal amount of 295
dollars, determined to be a "fair share" under the Plan, in order to shield
their businesses against rising health care costs in the future.
The Massachusetts Plan creates yet another problem, which is that small
business employers may seek to shift the cost of health care to their
employees, and avoid their responsibilities, by essentially converting the
employer mandate into the default individual mandate. I I Fearing health
care premiums that continue to soar to unpredictable heights, and that
gradually take up larger portions of businesses' operating expenses,
employers may have an incentive to hire independent contractors rather




110. Dedman, supra note 17.
111. See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2006) (defining "employee"
under Massachusetts' employer mandate as "any individual employed by an employer
subject to this chapter [149] for at least 1 month, provided that for the purpose of this
section self-employed individuals shall not be considered employees.").
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151A, § 2 (2006). Independent contractors are not
considered "employees" under the General Laws of Massachusetts when:
(a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control and
direction in connection with the performance of such services, both under his
contract for the performance of service and in fact; and
(b) such service is performed either outside the usual course of the business
for which the service is performed or is performed outside of all the places of
business of the enterprise for which the service is performed; and
(c) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, profession or business of the same nature as that involved
in the service performed.
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their larger corporation counterparts, it may be relatively cheaper and
easier for small businesses to restructure their employment arrangements
to maneuver around these employer mandate requirements. 1 3 Compared
to larger businesses, small businesses may have lower transaction costs
and greater flexibility in arranging employment structures in ways that
would enable them to maintain the functional equivalence and efficiency
of their workforce, by defining a worker's employment status into one not
covered under Chapter 58. l1 This incentive to structure non-covered
employment arrangements will most likely remain, so long as the
transaction costs for carrying out these rearrangements are lower than the
total expenses a business would incur for providing the lowest compliance-
level health care plan for its employees.
Lastly, small businesses operating at marginal profits may be tempted to
lay off employees who appear to be frequent free care users. 1 5  As
previously mentioned, under the current structure of the employer
mandate, and the potential penalty, employers may be more inclined to
adopt a wait-and-see policy when the costs of insurance premiums soar.
116
Given the stakes employers may now have on their employees'
uncompensated care usage, it is conceivable that some employers may lay
off a worker who has already maximized the amount of free care services
permitted by the Plan, or lay off certain workers they predict may be more
likely to use free care services in a given year. Although there are federal
and state anti-discrimination laws that may indirectly deter such practices,
some employee advocates are concerned that statutes such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act will not cover an employee with a health
risk like obesity.
117
In addition, it may be difficult for discharged employees to prove they
were let go due to health-related discrimination; such a discharge would
most likely be performed in a discrete manner, and sophisticated
employers may raise the defense of reduction in the workforce as a
Id.
113. ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM REPORT: EMPLOYER-SPONSORED COVERAGE:
SHAPE IT UP? SHIP IT OuT? 2 (2008) (stating that some analysts believe that change in
the structure of employment arrangements are one factor behind declining ESI
(employment-sponsored insurance) rates. In recent years, the share of self-employed
and contingent (or part-time) workers has risen. Contingent workers are less likely to
receive health care benefits from their employers than full-time employees).
114. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151A § l (bb) (2006) (defining "seasonal employee").
115. Companies Penalizing Workers with High Health Risks, USA TODAY, Sept. 10,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2007-09-09-risk-penalties-N.htm.
116. See supra Part II.B.
117. Companies Penalizing Workers with High Health Risks, supra note 115.
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justification.'18 This incentive could place some groups of employees - for
example, those who have chronic medical conditions known by their
employers - in precarious positions. Furthermore, if these vulnerable
employees believe they need to appear healthy to remain competitive in
the workplace, they may be deterred from using available medical
services. 1' 9  The disincentive to seek necessary, preventive medical
attention may increase the uninsured's reliance on emergency care in the
short-term and undermine the sustainability of the Massachusetts Plan by
increasing the premium cost of insurance in the long-term.
C. The Concept of Shared Responsibility is Not Well Served by the
Employer Provision as it Unduly Affects Small Employers
The legislative history and intent behind the enactment of the
Massachusetts Plan is well known. Cost reduction in insurance premiums,
greater affordability of health care, and expansion of the insured
population represent the key phases behind the Massachusetts
experiment. 12  The Massachusetts legislature chose to achieve long-term
health care affordability through shared responsibility; to jointly ensure its
short-term and long-term viability, the Plan mandated contributions from
uninsured individuals, businesses that do not traditionally offer health care,
and the government. 121  In taking this path, Massachusetts follows a
growing consensus among leading health care reform advocates who argue
that it is more politically viable to require diverse groups of the population
to work together comprehensively rather than target particular elements of
the health care system individually.
122
The creators of the Massachusetts experiment have envisioned a
collaborative effort by different sectors to fund their quest to expand
coverage. 123  The emphasis placed on everyone "play[ing] their part"
118. Kainka Kapur, The Impact of the Health Insurance Market on Small Firm
Employment, J. RISK & INS., Mar. 2004, at 67.
119. Marketplace: Coming to Work Sick Hurts Productivity (NPR online broadcast
Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld
=6560164) (discussing the problem of "presenteeism" a phenomenon of sick
employees showing up to work, as a problem jeopardizing productivity in the
workplace).
120. See Romney Remarks, supra note 17.
121. See Stuart Altman & Michael Doonan, Can Massachusetts Lead the Way in
Health Care Reform?, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2093, 2093 (2006).
122. Oxford Analytica, Healthcare reform gains traction with 'shared
responsibility' theme, THEHILL.COM, Oct. 10, 2007, http:l/thehill.com/op-
eds/healthcare-reform-gains-traction-with-shared-responsibility-theme-2007-10-
10.html.
123. See supra Part l.A.
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underscores the basic economic rationale behind the Massachusetts Plan,
which is that an increased pool of enrollees composed of previously
uninsured individuals - particularly those who had traditionally under-
utilized preventative and necessary medical services - is vital to the
stabilization of insurance premium increases.124 Specific features of the
Massachusetts Plan include legal mandates and subsidies that are designed
to force groups like the young and relatively healthy to enroll; this will
ensure that all individuals who are able to purchase insurance will
contribute to the general cost of insurance premiums. 125 In addition, a
portion of the funds currently available in the state's Uncompensated Care
Pool - which, prior to the enactment of the Massachusetts Plan was spent
on care provided by hospitals to the uninsured population - will now be
redirected to low-income persons in the form of state subsidies towards
their insurance. 126 This feature obligates the state to assume its share of
responsibility in the immediate funding of the Plan.
From a public policy perspective, however, the current structure of the
employer mandate provision, and the accompanying free-rider surcharge,
may directly and indirectly undermine the Massachusetts Plan's vision of
shared responsibility. 17 Small businesses, in assessing the practicalities of
complying with the mandate, face two polar opposite, yet equally practical,
choices. Neither choice faithfully follows the call of shared responsibility.
Strict compliance with the employer mandate places a disproportionate
financial strain on small businesses, by trimming their already marginal
profits, diluting their traditionally limited competitive advantage and
recruitment tools in the marketplace, and making their survival more
tenuous in the current climate of economic contraction.' In addition,
small business employers may lack information and resources in
complying with specific requirements imposed by key employer provisions
124. See Romney Remarks, supra note 17.
125. Id.
126. See also Edmund F. Haislmaier & Nina Owcharenko, The Massachusetts
Approach: A New Way to Restructure State Health Insurance Markets and Public
Programs, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1580, 1586 (2006).
127. See supra Part I.A.; see also Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of
Agricultural Resources, Health Care Reform Act of 2006,
http://www.mass.gov/agr/news/health carereform act.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2009)
(commenting that the Health Care Reform Act is "built on the concept of shared
responsibility-between people, business, and government. It requires all persons to
purchase health coverage if they can afford it. It requires businesses that do not
provide coverage to employees, to help pay for it. It requires the government to provide
subsidies to ensure affordability.").
128. See supra Part II.A.
All is Well in Massachusetts?
under Chapter 58.129 During the negotiation process leading up to the
implementation of the Massachusetts Plan, some observers expressed the
concern that "the small employers most likely to be affected by the reform
were largely left out of the discussion.
' 30
On the other hand, acting on cost-benefit considerations and other
market incentives, smaller employers attempt to evade the employer
mandate by passing the burden of insurance coverage to their
employees. Potential scenarios include opting to pay the fixed penalty
in lieu of providing insurance coverage, adopting a wait-and-see policy to
reimburse uncompensated care usage, structuring alternative employment
arrangements, and discriminating against employers based on medical care
usage. 132 Such actions also betray the notion of shared responsibility by
allowing smaller employers to escape from or diminish their share of the
burden in financing the expansion of insurance coverage called for by the
Massachusetts Plan.
In any event, both cases underscore the structural and enforcement
insufficiencies of the current employer provisions under the Massachusetts
Plan and will likely lead to results that are at odds with the notion of
shared responsibility, which is the Plan's cornerstone.
III. AN UPDATE FROM MASSACHUSETTS: ASSESSING THE
IMPACT OF THE EMPLOYER MANDATE TWO YEARS AFTER ITS
IMPLEMENTATION
When Chapter 58 was enacted in 2006, the latest federal government
estimates indicated that Massachusetts' health care costs per person, which
were higher than the national average by one-third, were the highest of any
state.133  It was further estimated that the total health costs in
Massachusetts would reach 75.6 billion dollars by 2009.134
129. FELLAND ET AL., supra note 60, at 2 (reporting that there is concern that many
smaller employers are unaware of what the reform will mean to them. One market
observer noted, "It's ironic. The big employers who will not be impacted probably
know the most because they have the ability and staff to keep up with the changes.
Small employers just don't have a lot of resources.").
130. Id.
131. See supra Part ll.B.
132. Id.
133. ALAN SAGER & DEBORAH SOSOLAR, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH SPENDING SOARS
TO $62.1 BILLION IN 2006 1 (Health Reform Program, Boston U. Sch. of Pub. Health,
June 28, 2006), available at http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/hs/Mass%2OHealth%2OSpending
%20Soars%20to%20$62%201%20Billion%20in%202006%20F1NAL%2028June.pdf.
134. Id. at 2.
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The initial reports following the implementation of Chapter 58 indicate
significant increases in insurance coverage and access to medical care.
135
By August of 2008, Massachusetts reported that 439,000 individuals
received insurance under Chapter 58 since its inception. 36  In addition,
during the first fiscal quarter of 2008, the dollar amount of uncompensated
state-provided care decreased by forty-one percent as compared to the first
quarter of 2007.137 Overall, the implementation of Chapter 58 caused the
state's rate of uninsured working-age adults to decrease by almost fifty
percent.'
38
While employers initially supported Chapter 58's implementation, two
factors may threaten their continued support.139 First, this reform has been
very costly and the cost of insurance premiums continues to rise.
140
Second, employers are becoming increasingly frustrated with state
pressures to provide more benefits under Chapter 58.141
Of the 439,000 newly insured individuals under Chapter 58, 159,000
individuals complied with the individual mandate requirement by
obtaining coverage through their employers. 142 This additional employer-
based coverage imposes substantial costs on the employers. The estimated
cost to employers since Chapter 58's implementation is approximately 542
million dollars, with additional costs likely as more residents are expected
to take up employer coverage. 143 Massachusetts employers continue to
experience large premium increases, which reached double digits for small
business employers. 144 As no clear mechanisms address the underlying
135. JOHN HOLAHAN AND LINDA BLUMBERG, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH REFORM:
SOLVING THE LONG-RUN COST PROBLEM 2 (URB. INST., January 2009), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411820_mass-healthreform.pdf (published as
part of the Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues Series).
136. MASS. Div. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. AND POL'Y, HEALTH CARE IN
MASSACHUSETTS: KEY INDICATORS 2 (August 2008), available at http://www.mass.gov/
Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/pubs/08/keyindicators_0808.pdf (Commonwealth of Mass.
Quarterly Report).
137. Id. at 7.
138. DEBRA A. DRAPER, ET. AL., MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH REFORM: HIGH COSTS
AND EXPANDING EXPECTATIONS MAY WEAKEN EMPLOYER SUPPORT 1 (Ctr. for Studying
Health Sys. Change, Issue Brief 123, Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1021/1021.pdf (percentage of uninsured adults
decreasing from thirteen percent to seven percent) [hereinafter DRAPER].
139. Id. at 2.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1, 3.
143. Id. at 3.
144. DRAPER, supra note 138, at 2-3.
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factors driving the costs under the current Act, there is the concern that the
current trajectory of the reform is "financially unsustainable" in this time
of economic contraction.m45
There seems to be increasing concern among small business groups
regarding the perceived additional requirements under Chapter 58. In
2006, the Massachusetts Plan attracted national attention, which made it
politically undesirable for small business employers to oppose its
enactment. 146 However, as coverage continues to expand, highlighted by a
series of new inclusions and requirements effective as of January 1,
2009-for example, prescription drug coverage in minimum credible
coverage requirements, a change in the definitional standards of
employers' "fair and reasonable" contribution, and the increased frequency
of filing requirements-small employers are becoming more alarmed by
the attendant costs. 147  As one small employer stated: "[T]he recent
proposals for new assessments and triggers are starting to really cause
major faults in the business community's support."
148
IV. RECOMMENDATION: THE CASE AGAINST THE
INCORPORATION OF THE EMPLOYER MANDATE INTO CURRENT
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM EFFORTS
Although the current administration is still in its infancy, its recent
actions have strongly signaled that a push for comprehensive health care
reform is one of the top priorities on the agenda. On February 4, 2009,
President Obama signed a reauthorization bill that expanded the State
Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), calling it "a downpayment
on my commitment to cover every single American.'" 149  As
comprehensive efforts to reform the health care system get underway, the
debate regarding the potential inclusion of an employer mandate will
surface once again.
During a time of great economic downturn and financial distress-
533,000 jobs were lost in November of 2008 alone 5°-an imposition of
the employer mandate will compound the struggles faced by small
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id. at 5.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Remarks by
President Barack Obama on Children's Health Insurance Program Bill Signing (Feb. 4,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pressoffice/RemarksbyPresident
BarackObamaOnChildrensHealthlnsuranceProgramBillSigning.
150. Hoover, supra note 94.
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businesses in this economy. Although the current administration could,
and probably will, point to Chapter 58 as an example of successful reform
towards universal health care coverage, several points illustrate the
difficulty and undesirability of predicting national success based on the
Massachusetts model. First, Massachusetts, prior to 2006, had one of the
lowest rates of uninsured population in the U.S. I 15  Presumably, the
administrative cost associated with enforcing an employer mandate in
Massachusetts would be proportionally lower than what it would be on a
national level, because Massachusetts Plan only needed to insure a
relatively small number of individuals who were not already insured. On
the national level, with over forty-six million Americans still uninsured,
152
the logistics and costs of enforcing such a mandate would be very
different.
Second, the economic condition and the political climate were vastly
different in Massachusetts in 2006. In theory, due to the disproportionate
financial and administrative burdens they will encounter in compliance,
small employers generally oppose the implementation of an employer
mandate. In Massachusetts in 2006, it was feasible, and perhaps even
practical, to exclude some of the affected small employers from the
discussions leading up to the reform. 153 In 2008, on a national level, it
may be foolish to ignore the political power and organization of small
business oppositions. Likewise, in a time of relative economic stability in
Massachusetts, it was "politically undesirable" for small businesses to
voice their opposition to the enactment of the employer mandate.' 54 In a
151. DIANE ARCHER, INST. FOR AM.'S FUTURE, MASS. HEALTH REFORM: NEAR
UNIVERSAL COVERAGE, BUT No COST CONTROLS OR GUARANTEE OF QUALITY,
AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL 7 (2009), available at
http://www.ourfuture.org/files/MA Health ReformFinal.pdf.
In 2006, Massachusetts ranked ninth among all states to offer employer-
sponsored insurance .... Massachusetts employers, therefore, were already
taking more responsibility for the health care of their employees than in most
other states .... [] Massachusetts did not have far to go to ensure residents
health insurance coverage; it already had the lowest rate of uninsurance in the
country-less than 8 percent.
Id.
152. William Snyder, What Do We Really Know About the Uninsured? Opinion
Journal, WALL ST. J, November 21, 2008, at A2 1.
153. FELLAND ET AL., supra note 60, at 2 (reporting that there is concern that many
smaller employers are unaware of what the reform will mean to them). One market
observer noted, "It's ironic. The big employers who will not be impacted probably
know the most because they have the ability and staff to keep up with the changes.
Small employers just don't have a lot of resources." Id.
154. See DRAPER, supra note 138, at 5.
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time of great economic distress, however, priorities naturally shift and it is
more justifiable, and even prudent, for small business employers to argue
against the imposition of the employer mandate. As one official at the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated bluntly, while all Americans should
have health insurance, "health insurance isn't enough if you're losing your
job because of [employer mandate] legislation.' 55 In summary, during a
time when many businesses generally struggle to survive, the incorporation
of an employer mandate on a national scale could hasten the demise of
small businesses.
Even when the economy does recover, however, an employer mandate is
still unnecessary and even counterproductive for small businesses. After
all, many smaller employers already offer health care coverage to attract, 156
employees, and non-providing employers will be placed at a
disadvantage. The voluntary provision of health care by small businesses
could be achieved without the imposition of employer mandate; the
mandate would be difficult to administer and even harder to enforce due to
the disincentives it creates. 157 Allowing smaller businesses the flexibility
to voluntarily provide health care coverage may also improve the eventual
quality of care, as the natural forces of the marketplace may encourage
small businesses to improve the quality of coverage in order to compete
with their counterparts.
One proposal the Obama administration has been considering is a
refundable tax credit to small businesses, which is essentially a
government subsidy toward these businesses' contribution towards
employee health premiums. 158 While such a proposal is wise and would
ideally relieve small businesses of the unique financial burdens they face
under universal health care reforms, the fear among the small employers
and the stigma presented by the concept of an employer mandate may
continue to hinder reform efforts.' 59  Rather than enact an employer
mandate containing complex structures to accommodate varying business
structures, and therefore equitably distribute this burden, it may be more
effective to simply remove the employer mandate, and rely upon other
mechanisms such as cost control and individual mandates, both of which
are beyond the scope of this Note.
155. Hoover, supra note 94.
156. See supra Part I[.A.
157. See supra Part II.
158. Will Small Business Back Health Reform?, BLOGS.ABCNEWS.COM, January 21,
2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2009/01/title-to-come.html.
159. Id. (quoting the National Federation of Independent Business' outgoing
president as saying "Mandating something people can't afford in the first place is a
non-starter.").
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CONCLUSION
The current application of the employer provisions under Massachusetts
Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006 raises important concerns regarding the
negative economic impacts that may ultimately undermine the viability
and sustainability of the Massachusetts Plan. Early concerns reflect the
fear that the Act will impose disproportionate financial and administrative
burdens on small businesses.' The implementation of an employer
mandate under the Plan diminishes the competitiveness of small businesses
in the marketplace.' 6' Furthermore, the added financial pressure on small
businesses to finance employee health care may also lead to depressed
wages, less desirable emplo ,ment arrangements, and even greater
vulnerability of unemployment. 62
Likewise, the existence of a statutory ceiling amount under the fair share
contribution provision offers employers the financially more secure and
attractive option of foregoing the provision of health care coverage at a
time when insurance premiums predictably soar to unpredictable levels.'
63
The financial certainty of non-compliance, combined with small
businesses' unique structures, undermines the Plan's purpose in the short-
term while exhausting its funding sources in the long-term. 164  The
problems presented by the employer mandate in the context of
Massachusetts serve as powerful warnings against its implementation as a
part of current reform efforts at the national level. In this time of great
economic distress, small businesses have a powerful case in opposition
against the employer mandate.
Ultimately, Massachusetts ought to be applauded for its bold vision to
tackle its health care crisis. Only the passage of time will tell whether this
vision was a success or a failure. In the end, perhaps the Massachusetts
experiment will remain just that-an experiment. The implementation of
Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006 highlighted one state's attempt to present a
tailored solution to its own health care crisis, and in the process, shed light
on one possible solution for America's health care crisis.
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